Review and Analysis of GAO Reports on Major Weapon Systems by McKeon, Donald
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2012-10-01
Review and Analysis of GAO Reports on Major
Weapon Systems
McKeon, Donald
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/54539
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. 
 








Review and Analysis of GAO Reports on Major Weapon 
Systems 
24 October 2012 
by 
Dr. Donald McKeon, Professor 




















The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Chair of the 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
 
To request Defense Acquisition Research or to become a research sponsor, 
please contact: 
 
NPS Acquisition Research Program 
Attn: James B. Greene, RADM, USN, (Ret.)  
Acquisition Chair 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Room 332 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
Tel: (831) 656-2092 
Fax: (831) 656-2253 
E-mail: jbgreene@nps.edu   
 







do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - i - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Abstract 
DoD major weapon systems historically have been over budget, behind 
schedule, and typically under performing in terms of suitability. The Secretary of 
Defense proposed a fiscal year (FY) 2010 budget that ended or curtailed all or part 
of at least a half dozen major defense acquisition programs that were over cost, 
behind schedule, or no longer suited to meet the warfighters’ current needs. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) publishes a major DoD weapon 
systems report every March. The GAO spends a considerable amount of time 
evaluating several dozen major weapon system programs and provides a two-page 
analysis of the largest defense programs.  
This research project examines eight major DOD weapon systems using the 
yearly published GAO reports from 2003–2011. The purpose of this research is to 
understand what risk management was being performed on those programs, how it 
was implemented, when it was implemented, and how effective it was. The desired 
outcome is to make recommendations on improvements to the risk management 
process recommended by the Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition (DoD, 
2006) 
More specifically, this research paper addresses risk mitigation activities that 
are considered best practices and that are documented in the yearly GAO 
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs reports. Changes in cost, schedule, 
and performance have been tracked over time, which provides a unique perspective 
to understanding program execution. 
It is not possible to examine every aspect of eight programs over a nine-year 
period. This project has focused on some key systems engineering principles that 
are risk-mitigation activities. The activities studied are acquisition strategy, including 
acquisition phases, milestones, technical reviews, and major decision reviews. Also 
evaluated were technical maturity, design maturity, earned value, production 
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An effective program acquisition strategy reduces program risks. Breaking the 
development into phases lowers the chances of designing or fielding a system that is 
immature. The milestone reviews are used to evaluate the system and to hold back 
programs that aren’t mature enough to proceed to the next phase. Technical reviews 
are used to measure the progress of the program development and are event based 
to ensure the timely completion of the development effort. Developmental and 
operational tests are used to verify system performance before large sums of money 
are spent on production units. 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) are a measure used by the Department 
of Defense to assess the maturity of an evolving technology prior to incorporating 
that technology into a system. Unfortunately, this research found that they are not a 
good indicator of program performance. Six of the eight programs studied identified 
their technologies as mature even though the programs experienced significant 
delays and cost overruns after the technologies had been identified as mature. 
In the GAO reports, design maturity was based on the number of released 
drawings. Some of the values are questionable because they are exact multiples of 
10%. In many cases, the percent of drawings decreased after obtaining 98% or 
higher in a previous year. This suggests that much redesign had taken place, that 
the measurement of the original value was poor, and/or that the original drawing was 
released before the design had stabilized.  
Earned value management (EVM) is a project management technique for 
measuring project performance and progress in an objective manner. Earned value 
was required on all of the programs in the GAO reports because of their size. 
However, only a few programs mentioned EVM in the GAO reports (only 22 times in 
nine years). Even when mentioned, the data were often vague. In some cases, the 
EVM system was identified as broken. Therefore, EVM was not an effective risk 
management tool. 
Using Statistical Process Control (SPC) tools is a best practice for managing 
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controlling the manufacturing processes that affect product quality. The GAO reports 
focused on the use of SPC, which was seldom used by contractors. Therefore, in 
most cases the risks of manufacturing problems could not be addressed. Production 
readiness reviews are also a best practice and should be used to address 
production risks. The production readiness review assesses the maturity of the 
design for going into production and can be an early indicator of future 
manufacturing problems.  
The GAO reports often neglected the role of software development in an 
acquisition program. Design maturity is not just the number of drawings released. 
That is only a measure of the physical hardware design. Software is usually very 
important and risky on large weapon programs. Any company that claims to be 
CMMI Level 2 or higher will be using metrics to manage their software projects. So, 
theoretically, performance metrics should exist and should be reported to manage 
the risk of software development problems.  
Keywords: DoD major weapon systems, Technology Readiness Levels 
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I. Introduction 
The hypothesis of this research project is that when risks increase during 
development, they need to be continuously reflected in cost, schedule, and 
performance. This is not a radically new idea. The DoD and contractors treat risk as 
a component of cost, schedule, and performance when the government issues a 
request for proposal (RFP) and the contractor submits a bid. 
A. Problem Statement 
DoD major weapon systems historically have been over budget, behind 
schedule, and typically under performing in terms of suitability. The 2010 GAO report 
on major weapon systems (GAO-10-388SP) stated, 
The Secretary of Defense proposed a fiscal year 2010 budget that ended or 
curtailed all or part of at least a half dozen major defense acquisition 
programs—such as the Air Force’s F-22A Raptor, the Army’s Future Combat 
System, the Navy’s DDG 1000 destroyer, and the Missile Defense Agency’s 
Multiple Kill Vehicle—that were over cost, behind schedule, or no longer 
suited to meet the warfighters’ current needs. (p. 1) 
On the subject of technical maturity, the report (GAO, 2010) stated, 
While the design knowledge of DOD programs at the system-level critical 
design review has increased since 2003, these programs are still not regularly 
demonstrating that these designs can meet performance requirements by 
testing integrated prototypes before the critical design review—a best 
practice. … Of the 33 programs that reported that they either had tested or 
were going to test an early system prototype and provided a critical design 
review date, only 4 did so before their critical design review. The remaining 
programs tested or will test their prototype, on average, 31 months after their 
critical design review. While few programs test integrated prototypes by the 
critical design review, DOD programs are testing prototypes earlier. … (p. 15) 
On the subject of software growth, 
Many programs are at risk for cost growth and schedule delays because of 
software development issues. We reported in our last assessment that 
programs experiencing more than a 25 percent growth in software lines of 
code since development start had higher development cost growth and longer 
schedule delays than other programs. Seventeen of the 28 programs that 
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code required for the system to function has grown or will grow by 25 percent 
or more—up from 14 programs in our last assessment. Overall, the average 
lines of code growth or planned growth for the 28 programs was about 92 
percent. (p. 20) 
B. Purpose of this Study 
This research project examines eight major DOD weapon systems using 
yearly published GAO reports. The purpose of this research is to understand what 
risk management was being performed on those programs, how it was implemented, 
when it was implemented, and how effective it was. The desired outcome is to make 
recommendations on improvements to the risk management process recommended 
by the Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition (DoD, 2006). This effort is 
Phase I of a multi-phase research project (Naval Postgraduate School, BAA Number 
NPS-BAA-11-02). 
C. Overview of the Research Methodology 
This research project is based on the GAO’s 2003–2011 reports on major 
weapon systems. Eight different programs were identified for study. The yearly 
accomplishments have been used in this research project to build a historical record 
of each program. The historical records have been used to assess the effectiveness 
of risk management activities from prior years. The data answer the questions, 
“What was planned and what actually happened?”  
D. Research Questions 
Research questions include the following: 
 Can the effectiveness of risk management be improved by 
continuously incorporating risk in a program’s cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives and plans? 
 How is systems engineering being used to manage risk? 
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E. Research Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this research project is that when risks increase during 
development, they need to be continuously reflected in cost, schedule, and 
performance. 
F. Objectives and Outcomes 
The desired outcome is to make recommendations on improvements to the 
risk management process recommended by the Risk Management Guide to DoD 
Acquisition (DoD, 2006). 
G. Limitations of the Study 
The research project is based on GAO reports for major DoD weapon system 
acquisition programs. It may not apply to smaller DoD programs. 
H. Validity of the Research 
The research is based on GAO reports that are based on an analysis of major 
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II. Literature Review 
This research project is based on written reports from the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) on major DoD weapon systems. The GAO reports come 
out in March of every year and generally provide a two-page analysis of the largest 
major defense programs. The GAO reports exist from 2003–2011, although the first 
report (GAO, 2003) covered a smaller number of programs than the reports 
published from 2004–2011. The following are the GAO reports reviewed in this 
research project: 
 Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, GAO-
03-476 (May 2003) 
 Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 
GAO-04-248 (March 2004) 
 Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 
GAO-05-301 (March 2005) 
 Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 
GAO-06-391 (March 2006) 
 Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 
GAO-07-406SP (March 2007) 
 Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 
GAO-08-467SP (March 2008) 
 Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 
GAO-09-326SP (March 2009) 
 Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 
GAO-10-388SP (March 2010) 
 Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, 
GAO-11-233SP (March 2011) 
The purpose of the GAO reports was stated in the 2011 report, GAO-11-
233SP: 
The report is in response to the mandate in the joint explanatory statement to 
the DOD Appropriations Act, 2009. It includes observations on the 
performance of DOD’s 2010 portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition 
programs; data on selected factors that can affect program outcomes; an 
assessment of the knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition 
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in development or early production; and observations on the implementation 
of acquisition reforms. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed cost, schedule, 
and quantity data from DOD’s Selected Acquisition Reports and collected 
data from program offices on performance requirements and software 
development; technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge; and the 
implementation of DOD’s acquisition policy and acquisition reforms. GAO also 
compiled one- or two-page assessments of 71 weapon programs. (p. 0) 
Analysis of the GAO reports consisted of examining the write-up for each 
program over the nine-year period, looking for trends in the data, identifying risk-
mitigation activities, and evaluating the overall effectiveness of the risk management 
process.  
Programs that were studied in this research project had write-ups for most of 
the years studied (2003–2011). In addition, programs were selected to cover the 
following characteristics: 
 the largest program ever in the DoD; 
 a program with a very small number of production units (< 6); 
 a large program with COTS as a critical component; 
 a large joint program; 
 a program that has little software; and 
 several programs in which software is critical to the success of the 
program. 
Eight programs were selected for review. One is an Army system, one is a 
Marine Corps system, four are Air Force Systems, and two are joint systems. The 
systems selected went through the acquisition life cycle from technology 
development until low-rate initial production and operational test and evaluation. 
Some reached full rate production. The programs that were selected for study are 
the following: 
1. Excalibur (Army): Excalibur is a family of global positioning system–
based, fire-and-forget, 155-mm cannon artillery precision munitions 
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2. Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)1: The Marine Corps’ EFV is 
designed to transport troops from ships offshore to inland locales at 
higher speeds and from longer distances than its predecessor, the 
Assault Amphibious Vehicle 7A1 (AAV 7A1). 
3. C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP): The 
Air Force’s C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. The 
RERP is designed to enhance the reliability, maintainability, and 
availability of the C-5 by replacing the propulsion system; modifying the 
mechanical, hydraulic, avionics, fuel, and landing gear systems; and 
making required structural modifications. 
4. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS; Cluster 1)2: This DoD program is 
developing software-defined radios that will interoperate with selected 
radios and increase communications and networking capabilities. 
5. Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): The DoD’s JSF program3 is developing a 
family of stealthy, strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine 
Corps, and U.S. allies, with the goal of maximizing commonality to 
minimize life-cycle costs. 
6. Reaper: The Air Force’s MQ-9 Reaper is a multirole, medium-to-high-
altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable of flying at 
higher speeds and higher altitudes than its predecessor, the MQ-1 
Predator A. 
7. Global Hawk4: The Air Force’s Global Hawk is a high-altitude, long-
endurance unmanned aircraft with integrated sensors and ground 
stations providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
capabilities. 
8. Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High: The Air Force’s SBIRS 
High satellite system is being developed to replace the Defense 
Support Program and perform a range of missile warning, missile 
defense, technical intelligence, and battle-space awareness missions. 
GAO data were available for the following years: 
1. Excalibur: 2004–2011 (eight years) 
                                            
1 Called the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) in 2003. 
2 Also called the JTRS Ground Mobile Radios (GMR). 
3 Also called the F-35. 
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2. EFV: 2003–2011 (nine years) 
3. C-5 RERP: 2004–2011 (eight years) 
4. JTRS: 2004–2011 (eight years) 
5. JSF: 2003–2011 (nine years) 
6. Reaper: 2004–2011 (eight years) 
7. Global Hawk: 2004–2011 (eight years) 
8. SBIRS: 2003–2011 (nine years) 
An example of a GAO write-up is shown in Appendix B. Key information from 
the GAO reports used in this research project are the following: 
1. Financial Data 
 Research & Development (R&D) cost (total estimated) 
 R&D funding needed to complete 
 Yearly R&D cost 
 Procurement cost 
 Procurement quantity 
 Unit cost 
2. Schedule 
 Development start 
 Low-rate decision 
 Full-rate decision 
 Last procurement 
 IOC (initial operating capability) 
 Acquisition time 
 EDM (engineering development model) 
 Design and/or technical reviews 
3. Technical 
 Technical maturity 
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 Production maturity (primarily the use of statistical process 
control) 
 Software development 
Of these sources of information, the group called Technical is directly related 
to technical risk management. Other risk-management considerations include the 
overall acquisition strategy, use of prototypes (including EDMs and LRIP units), and 
the scheduling of design and technical reviews. 
Not all of the write-ups contained all of this information. One area that was 
poorly documented was software development. As an approximation, the number of 
sentences in each write-up that mentioned software was counted and used as an 
indicator of the importance of software to the program. This assumption is not 
expected to be a data-driven measure of software risk. 
The yearly R&D expenditures were not listed in the GAO reports, but they 
were derived from the yearly values for R&D costs and total R&D costs to complete. 
That is, by using each year’s “Research and development costs” from the Program 
Performance table and the “R&D funding needed to complete” from the Program 
Essentials table, it was possible to determine the amount of R&D funds spent each 
year. 
All financial figures were adjusted for inflation and put into 2011 dollars. The 
yearly inflation rates were obtained by looking at the “As of …” cost listed in the 
Program Performance tables and backing out the yearly inflation rates. The C-5 
RERP, JSF, and SBIRS programs had nearly identical inflation rates and the values 
from the C-5 RERP values were used in this analysis (shown in Error! Reference 
source not found.). Use of the inflation rates is important when trying to assess 
year-to-year cost increases since costs were reported in current dollars for the time 
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Figure 1. Inflation Rates Used for the Financial Analysis of the  




















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 11 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
III. Research Methodology 
A broad definition of research was given by Martyn Shuttleworth (2008): “In 
the broadest sense of the word, the definition of research includes any gathering of 
data, information and facts for the advancement of knowledge.” 
Another definition of research was given by J.W. Creswell (2008) who stated, 
“Research is a process of steps used to collect and analyze information to increase 
our understanding of a topic or issue.” According to Creswell, research consists of 
three steps: pose a question, collect data to answer the question, and present an 
answer to the question. 
Research can be defined as the search for knowledge, or as any systematic 
investigation, with an open mind, to establish novel facts, solve new or existing 
problems, prove new ideas, or develop new theories, usually using a scientific 
method. Scientific research relies on the application of the scientific method. This 
research provides scientific information and theories for the explanation of the nature 
and the properties of the world around us.  
A. Research Strategy 
This effort is Phase I of a multi-phase research project (Naval Postgraduate 
School, BAA Number NPS-BAA-11-02). The hypothesis of this multi-phase research 
project is that when risks increase during development, they need to be continuously 
reflected in cost, schedule, and performance. This is not a radically new idea. The 
DoD and contractors treat risk as a component of cost, schedule, and performance 
when the government issues a request for proposal (RFP) and the contractor 
submits a bid.  
The overall research project will be done in phases with a separate research 
paper for each phase. This “incremental” approach, which in itself is a risk-mitigation 
strategy, will allow the researcher to focus on specific research questions and will 
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 Phase I: Conduct a review of the treatment of risk on several major 
weapon systems using GAO reports (this report); 
 Phase II: Conduct a survey of the DoD acquisition workforce in the 
risk-taking behavior of the workforce under different situations 
(McKeon, 2012a); 
 Phase III: Conduct experiments on the risk-taking behavior of the 
workforce under different situations (McKeon, 2012b); 
 Phase IV: Develop a stochastic computer simulation to model and test 
the risk-taking characteristics of government workforce members; and 
 Phase V: Interview DoD and industry project managers (or 
equivalents) in best practices of risk management.  
This research paper covers Phase I of this research project.  
B. Data Collection 
For Phase I of the overarching research project on risk management within 
the DoD, the yearly GAO reports on major DoD weapon systems were used in this 
research study.5 The yearly GAO reports are released in March and generally 
provide a two-page analysis of the largest major defense programs. The reports are 
public-disclosure documents and include financial data and technical maturity 
information. The GAO reports exist from 2003–2011, although the first report (2003) 
covered a smaller number of programs than the reports published from 2003–2011. 
Analysis of the GAO reports consisted of examining the write-up for each 
program over the nine-year period, looking for trends in the data, identifying risk-
mitigation activities, and evaluating the overall effectiveness of the risk management 
process.  
C. Analysis of the GAO Reports 
The GAO reports were reviewed to obtain the following data: 
1. Program Schedule 
a) There are several values that relate to schedule. The most 
obvious is the “Acquisition cycle time (months)” that is in the 
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main table on the first page of the report. This measures the 
time from “development start” to “initial capability.” 
b) Another schedule parameter is “development start” to “low-rate 
decision.” This was not reported, but it was easily determined 
from the schedule given on the first page of each write-up. In 
some cases, the time to LRIP increased but the “acquisition 
time” or the time to FRP did not change, which suggested a 
high-risk approach to planning.  
c) Another schedule parameter was “development start” to “full-
rate decision.” This was an important measure for programs that 
entered LRIP at a low maturity level. The time to FRP captured 
the time to mature the design and production processes. 
2. Program Costs. There are several important cost values listed on the first 
page of each report. 
a) R&D costs: There is a cost stated at the start of development 
and the most current estimate at completion. The values are 
adjusted for inflation. The current estimate at completion is the 
single most important piece of information used in this research 
project. 
b) Procurement unit cost was also included in each GAO report.  
c) Program unit cost: This value was given in each report and was 
used in this analysis. The value is dependent on the quantity 
fielded and so changes in quantity have to be considered when 
evaluating this cost data. 
d) Funding needed to complete: R&D. This value was very 
important because it gave a snapshot of the technical state of 
the program. This value and the R&D costs were used to 
determine the R&D dollars spent every year. 
3. Total Quantities 
a) The total number of systems planned to be purchased for 
procurement was listed on the first page of each report. This 
information was important for understanding the program and 
procurement unit costs. 
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a) There was a chart called “Attainment of Product Knowledge” 
which by itself was not very useful. However, each report had a 
section called “Technology Maturity.” This was very useful to 
define the technical maturity of the program, but technical 
maturity rarely correlated with program success. 
5. Design Maturity  
There was very useful information in the section called “Design Maturity.” 
a) The GAO reports listed the percent of design drawings 
complete. Some of the reported values were not very accurate, 
which will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
b) The reports sometimes mentioned software development. It was 
very difficult to appraise the software maturity because metrics 
were not used. However, as a crude metric, the number of 
sentences that mentioned “software” were counted and used to 
assess the maturity of the software development effort. 
6. Production Maturity.  
a) There was a section on production maturity, but it did not use 
manufacturing readiness levels (MRLs). The write-ups often 
said that the assessors could not assess production maturity 
because statistical process controls were not being used. In 
some cases, other activities or accomplishments were looked at 
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IV. Findings 
This research project is based on written reports from the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) on major DoD weapon systems. The GAO reports come 
out in March of every year and generally provide a two-page analysis of the largest 
major defense programs. The GAO reports exist from 2003–2011, although the first 
report (2003) covered a smaller number of programs than the reports published from 
2003–2011. GAO data6 were available for the following years: 
1. Excalibur: 2004–2011 (eight years) 
2. EFV: 2003–2011 (nine years) 
3. C-5 RERP: 2004–2011 (eight years) 
4. JTRS: 2004–2011 (eight years) 
5. JSF: 2003–2011 (nine years) 
6. Reaper: 2004–2011 (eight years) 
7. Global Hawk: 2004–2011 (eight years) 
8. SBIRS: 2003–2011 (nine years) 
A. Excalibur: 2004–2011 (Eight Years) 
The Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile yearly schedules 
and milestones from 1997–2011 are shown in Error! Reference source not found.. 
Every published schedule is shown as a row in the table. For example, in 2004, the 
LRIP decision was scheduled for June 2006, the full-rate production (FRP) decision 
was planned for June 2008, and IOC was planned for September 2008. The 2004 
schedule did not show a design review in 2005, but starting in 2006 the schedule 
showed a design review in either April or May of 2005. 
                                            
6 Disclaimer: Some information in the GAO reports was incomplete and some programs had 
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The milestone chart is useful because it clearly shows schedule slip in FRP 
and IOC as a function of time. For example, IOC was originally planned to occur in 
September 2008 and that schedule was in place until 2008 when IOC slipped to 
January 2009. In 2009, the forecasted IOC slipped 13 months. Overall IOC slipped 
29 months in the three years from 2009–2011.  
Error! Reference source not found. is another way to look at the program 
milestones. Three curves are plotted: time to LRIP, time to FRP, and total acquisition 
cycle time (all measured in months from the start of program development). The first 
two datasets are derived from the yearly schedules, while the last one is from the 
“Program Performance” table in every GAO write-up. The schedule data looks very 
favorable through 2008, then starts to show significant schedule delays. The overall 
program schedule delay was 35 months in a four-year period. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the R&D costs for the program. 
All costs have been adjusted for inflation. The GAO reports did not report a yearly 
R&D spending, so it was derived7 from the reported cost data. In the figure, the 
planned total program cost is shown as the black line with squares. There was a 
large program cost increase in 2005. The “R&D funding needed to complete” the 
program, listed in the “Program Essentials” block in each GAO report, is shown as 
the green line with triangles.  
The red line with asterisks is the actual R&D spending for each year. The red 
curve clearly shows the drop in R&D funding from 2007 to 2008. Spending was flat 
to 2007 and then it was flat, but at a lower level, until 2010. The blue line with 
diamonds is total R&D spending from the beginning of the program.  
                                            
7 The R&D spending for a year was not reported, but it could be determined from the reported R&D 
costs from two years of data. Mathematically, R&D spent (year i) = (Budgeted(year i) – 
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Error! Reference source not found. shows the total production quantity, the 
procurement unit costs8 and the program unit costs.9 There are large quantity 
changes in 2005, 2006, and 2011. The procurement and program unit costs 
increased significantly in 2011. The program unit cost increased by 193% and the 
procurement cost increased by 93%. There was a Nunn-McCurdy10 breach in 2010 
when the production quantity dropped and the procurement unit cost increased from 
$47,000 to $99,000. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the technical maturity for each 
year based on the GAO reports. Three critical technologies were identified for the 
program and it was reported that all technologies were mature starting in 2006. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the percent of drawings 
completed. It shows a flat trend at 100% from 2006 until 2010 and then a decrease 
to 90% in 2011. The percent drawings completed is not a good measure of design 
maturity because $257 million (est.) was spent on R&D from 2007 until 2010, even 
though it was reported that 100% of the design drawings had been completed. 
Design problems were not recognized until 2011.  
None of the yearly Excalibur write-ups mentioned software. There is 
undoubtedly software or firmware being developed or modified, such as system 
                                            
8 The procurement unit cost is the total procurement cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. Procurement unit cost does not 
include R&D costs. 
9 The program unit cost is the total program cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. The total program costs are the 
R&D costs plus the procurement costs.  
10 The Nunn–McCurdy Amendment or Nunn–McCurdy Provision, introduced by Senator Sam Nunn 
and Congressman Dave McCurdy in the United States 1982 Defense Authorization Act, is designed 
to curtail cost growth in American weapons procurement programs. It requires notification of the 
United States Congress if the cost per unit grows more than 15% beyond what was originally 
estimated, and calls for the termination of programs with total cost growth greater than 25%, unless 
the Secretary of Defense submits a detailed explanation certifying 1) the program is essential to 
national security, and that no suitable alternative of lesser cost is available; 2) new estimates of total 
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operation, operation, targeting, and so forth. The GAO reports do not indicate that 
software was an issue for the program. 
 
Figure 2. Excalibur: Milestones Based on GAO Reports 
Note. Each yearly schedule from the GAO reports is shown as a row in the table. Milestones such as 
DR (design review), LRIP, FRP, IOC, Nunn (Nunn-McCurdy breach), and ReX (restart) are shown. 
The white cells are the year of the report and milestones shown in the white cells are planned to 
occur during the year. The milestones shown in the green cells had already occurred11 at the time of 
the GAO report. The milestones shown in the yellow cells were planned milestones at the time of the 
report for the years after the GAO report.  
 
 
Figure 3. Excalibur Milestone Schedule 
                                            
11 In theory, the milestones in green should not change from year to year; however, in some cases 
there are minor differences. 
Project
Excalibur Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4





2004 •Prog Start •ReX •DR •LRIP FRP• •IOC
2005 •Prog Start •ReX •DR •LRIP FRP• •IOC
2006 •Prog Start •ReX DR ••LRIP FRP ••IOC
2007 •Prog Start DR ••LRIP FRP ••IOC
2008 •Prog Start DR ••LRIP FRP• •IOC
2009 •Prog Start DR ••LRIP FRP• •IOC
2010 •Prog Start DR ••LRIP FRP•OC
2011 •Prog Start •DR •LRIP •FRP•IOC
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Note. The red line with triangles is the program acquisition cycle time listed in the GAO write-ups (in 
months). The blue line with diamonds is the time from development start to LRIP (in months). The 
black line with boxes is the time from development start to FRP (in months). 
 
 
Figure 4. Excalibur R&D Cost Profile 
Note. The green line with triangles is the “R&D funding needed to complete” the program and is from 
the “Program Essentials” section of each GAO report. The black line with boxes is the planned total 
R&D cost taken from the “Program Performance” section of each report. The red line with black 
asterisks is the R&D spending during the year. The blue line with diamonds is the Total R&D 
spending from the beginning of the project. It is derived from the “funding needed to complete” and 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 20 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 5. Excalibur: Production Quantity and Unit Costs 
Note. The black line with squares is the procurement unit cost adjusted for inflation. The red line with 
triangles is the program unit cost adjusted for inflation (the program unit cost includes the R&D costs 
amortized over the total production lot). 
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Figure 7. Excalibur: Drawings Completed 
 
B. Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 2003–2011 
The EFV (formerly the AAAV) program was in the GAO reports from 2003–
2011. The program was cancelled in 2011 after the GAO report was issued. Even 
though the program has been terminated, the past data is useful for understanding 
program risks. 
The schedules for the period 2001–2011 are shown in Error! Reference 
source not found.. Every published schedule is shown as a row in the table. The 
columns represent the different years in each yearly schedule. For example, in 2003 
the LRIP decision was scheduled for September 2005, the full-rate production 
decision was planned for August 2007, and IOC was planned for September 2008. 
This chart is useful because it clearly shows schedule slip as a function of time. 
There was a Nunn-McCurdy breach in 2007, which shows up as a large schedule 
slip between 2007 and 2008. 
Error! Reference source not found. is another way to look at the program 
milestones. Three curves are plotted: time to LRIP, time to FRP, and total acquisition 
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two datasets are derived from the yearly schedules, while the last one is from the 
“Program Performance” table in every GAO write-up. The chart shows the large 
increase in schedule in 2008. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the R&D costs for the program. 
All costs have been adjusted for inflation. The GAO reports did not report a yearly 
R&D spending, so it was derived from the reported cost data. In the figure, the 
planned total program cost is shown as the black line with squares. The “R&D 
funding needed to complete” the program, listed in the “Program Essentials” block in 
each GAO report, is shown as the green line with triangles.  
The red line with asterisks is the actual R&D spending for each year. 
Spending was flat throughout the program. The blue line with diamonds is the actual 
R&D spending from the beginning of the program.  
The “planned total cost” (black curve) shows a step increase every other year, 
which may be an artifact of the data collection or budget reporting and is not a 
change in scope of the program. There was a steady increase in planned total cost 
throughout the life of the program, with a large step increase in 2008 due to the 
Nunn-McCurdy re-baseline. It is interesting to note that the cost increases were 
about equal to the expenditures, so the program was not getting closer to 
completion.  
Error! Reference source not found. shows the total production quantity, the 
procurement unit costs,12 and the program unit costs.13 There was a large quantity 
change in 2008 (a 42% decrease) and large increases in the procurement and 
program unit costs. The program unit cost increased by 107% and the procurement 
cost increased by 88%.  
                                            
12 The procurement unit cost is the total procurement cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. Procurement unit cost does not 
include R&D costs. 
13 The program unit cost is the total program cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. The total program costs are the 
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Error! Reference source not found. shows the technical maturity for each 
year based on the GAO reports. Initially, the program reported five critical 
technologies, but then it dropped to four starting in 2008. It was reported that all 
technologies were mature starting in 2005. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the number of design drawings 
completed for each year. The data show that the program did not have a good 
handle on the quality and/or number of drawings completed. The data showed that 
100% of the drawings had been completed in 2005, although R&D spending was still 
on the order of $300 million, which implies that some redesign of critical components 
was underway. Starting in 2006, there was a recognition that redesign was 
necessary although the magnitude of the redesign effort was underestimated. 
The GAO write-ups do not have a specific measure of software maturity. As 
an approximation, the number of sentences in each report that mentioned software 
was counted as a gauge of the software development. Error! Reference source 
not found. shows the number of lines in the EFV GAO reports that mention 
software. The GAO write-ups mentioned software 10 times in 2007, but software 
wasn’t mentioned from 2008–2010. 
 
Figure 8. EFV Schedule 
Note. Each yearly schedule from the GAO reports is shown as a row in the table. Milestones such as 
DR (design review), LRIP, FRP, IOC, Nunn (Nunn-McCurdy breach), and Dev Start (development 
start) are shown. The white cells are the year of the report and milestones shown in the white cells 
are planned to occur during the year. The milestones shown in the green cells had already occurred 
at the time of the GAO report. The milestones shown in the yellow cells were planned milestones at 
the time of the report for the years after the GAO report.  
Project
EFV Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
1995 •Prog Start •Dev Start
2000
2001 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP •FRP •IOC
2002 •Prog Start •Dev Start
2003 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP •FRP •IOC
2004 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP FRP• •IOC
2005 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP FRP• •IOC
2006 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP FRP• •IOC
2007 •Prog Start •Dev Start
2008 •Prog Start •Dev Start •Nunn •LRIP
2009 •Prog Start •Dev Start •Nunn •Restart •LRIP
2010 •Prog Start •Dev Start •Nunn •Restart •OT •LRIP
2011 •Prog Start •Dev Start •Nunn •Restart •OT •LRIP
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Figure 9. EFV Schedule (Months From Development Start) 
Note. The red line with triangles is the program acquisition cycle time listed in the GAO write-ups (in 
months). The blue line with diamonds is the time from development start to LRIP (in months). The 
black line with boxes is the time from development start to FRP (in months). When data points are 









Figure 10. EFV R&D Cost Profile 
Note. The green line with triangles is the “R&D funding needed to complete” the program and is from 
the “Program Essentials” section of each GAO report. The black line with boxes is the planned total 
R&D cost taken from the “Program Performance” section of each report. The red line with black 
asterisks is the R&D spending during the year. The blue line with diamonds is the Total R&D 
spending from the beginning of the project. It is derived from the “funding needed to complete” and 
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Figure 11. EFV Production Plan and Unit Cost 
Note. The black line with squares is the procurement unit cost adjusted for inflation. The red line with 
triangles is the program unit cost adjusted for inflation (the program unit cost includes the R&D costs 
amortized over the total production lot). 
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Figure 13. EFV: Design Maturity Based on the Number of Drawings Completed 
 
 
Figure 14. EFV: Number of Lines in the GAO Reports That  
Mentioned Software 
C. C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program 
(RERP): 2004–2011 (Eight Years) 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the published C-5 RERP yearly 
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row in the table. The columns represent the different years in each yearly schedule. 
The yearly schedules are very misleading. Looking at the data, only year 2008 
shows a big change in schedule. There was a Nunn-McCurdy breach in 2008. 
Error! Reference source not found. is another way to look at the program 
milestones. Three curves are plotted: time to LRIP, time to IOC, and total acquisition 
cycle time (all measured in months from the start of program development). The first 
two datasets are derived from the yearly schedules, while the last one is from the 
“Program Performance” table in every GAO write-up. The chart shows the large 
increase in schedule in 2008. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the R&D costs for the program. 
All costs have been adjusted for inflation. The GAO reports did not report a yearly 
R&D spending, so it was derived from the reported cost data. In the figure, the 
planned total program cost is shown as the black line with squares. The reason(s) 
for the drop in “planned total R&D costs” in 2006 and 2007 is/are unknown, but may 
be the result of a mathematical error in the reported data. 
The “R&D funding needed to complete” the program, listed in the “Program 
Essentials” block in each GAO report, is shown as the green line with triangles. The 
red line with asterisks is the actual R&D spending for each year. R&D spending was 
dropping every year. The blue line with diamonds is the actual R&D spending from 
the beginning of the program.  
Error! Reference source not found. shows the total production quantity, the 
procurement unit costs,14 and the program unit costs.15 The quantity dropped from 
111 to 52 in 2009 (a 53% decrease). Unit costs (including R&D) rose from $87 
million to $137 million (a 57% increase). (The quantity and, therefore, the 
                                            
14 The procurement unit cost is the total procurement cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. This cost does not include R&D 
costs. 
15 The program unit cost is the total program cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. The total program costs are the 
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procurement unit cost in 2008 seem to be in error. The quantity for 2008 should 
have been 52.) 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the technical maturity for each 
year based on the GAO reports. One critical technology was reported for the 
program (the new engine) and since it was a commercially available engine, the 
program reported it as mature throughout the program. 
In many cases, design maturity was based on the number of drawings 
released. There are a couple of points to consider. First, many of the quoted values 
seem to be arbitrary. In Error! Reference source not found., the 
program/contractor reported 98% for three years. On might ask if they stopped 
working on drawings in 2003? Then the number of drawings dropped to 90%, then 
80%, then back to 90%, and then to 100%. Nothing works that predictably. The 
“number of drawings completed” that were reported do not seem realistic. 
The GAO write-ups do not have a specific measure of software maturity. As 
an approximation, the number of sentences in each report that mentioned software 
was counted as a gauge of the software development. Error! Reference source 
not found. shows the number of lines in the GAO reports that mention software. 
Software was mentioned 15 times between 2004 and 2006, but only once between 
2007 and 2011. In 2004, the write-up mentioned, “According to program officials, the 
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Figure 15. C-5 RERP Yearly Schedule 
Note. Each yearly schedule from the GAO reports is shown as a row in the table. Milestones such as 
DR (design review), LRIP, FRP, IOC, Nunn (Nunn-McCurdy breach), and ReX (restart) are shown. 
The white cells are the year of the report and milestones shown in the white cells are planned to 
occur during the year. The milestones shown in the green cells had already occurred at the time of 
the GAO report. The milestones shown in the yellow cells were planned milestones at the time of the 
report for the years after the GAO report.  
 
 
Figure 16. C-5 RERP Schedule (Months From Program Start) 
Note. The red line with triangles is the program acquisition cycle time listed in the GAO write-ups (in 
months). The blue line with diamonds is the time from development start to LRIP (in months). The 
black line with boxes is the time from development start to FRP (in months). When data points are 
missing, a dashed line is drawn between points. The dashed lines are for visual purposes only. 
 
Project






2004 •Prog Start •Dev Start •Restart •LRIP •FRP •IOC
2005 •Prog Start •Dev Start •Restart •LRIP •FRP •IOC
2006 •Prog Start •Dev Start •Restart •LRIP •FRP
2007 •Prog Start •Dev Start •Restart Nunn• •LRIP •FRP
2008 •Prog Start •Dev Start •Restart •EDM•Nunn •FRP
2009 •Prog Start •Dev Start •Restart •EDM•Nunn •FRP
2010 •Prog Start •Dev Start •Restart •EDM•Nunn •FRP
2011 •Prog Start •Dev Start •Restart •EDM•Nunn•LRIP •FRP
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Figure 17. C-5 RERP: R&D Costs 
Note. The green line with triangles is the “R&D funding needed to complete” the program and is from 
the “Program Essentials” section of each GAO report. The black line with boxes is the planned total 
R&D cost taken from the “Program Performance” section of each report. The red line with black 
asterisks is the R&D spending during the year. The blue line with diamonds is the Total R&D 
spending from the beginning of the project. It is derived from the “funding needed to complete” and 







do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 32 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 18. C-5 RERP: Total Production and Unit Cost 
Note. The black line with squares is the procurement unit cost adjusted for inflation. The red line with 
triangles is the program unit cost adjusted for inflation (the program unit cost includes the R&D costs 
amortized over the total production lot).  
The quantity for 2008 should have been 52. 
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Figure 20. C-5 RERP: Design Drawings Completed 
 
 
Figure 21. C-5 RERP: Number of Lines Mentioning Software 
 
D. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS): 2004–2011 (Eight 
Years) 
The JTRS program scope changed during the evaluation period. This is one 
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component of the JTRS system. Error! Reference source not found. shows the 
program milestones that were published each year in the GAO reports. This chart is 
useful because it clearly shows schedule slip as a function of time. Every published 
schedule is shown as a row in the table. The columns represent the different years 
in each yearly schedule. For example, in 2005, the LRIP decision was scheduled for 
April 2006 and the full-rate production decision was planned for June 2007.  
The 2006 GAO write-up had the following information regarding the program 
structure: “The JTRS Cluster 1 program is currently being restructured due to 
significant cost and schedule problems that came to light in late 2004.” Milestones 
were not given in the 2006 GAO report; however, they were given in the 2007 report. 
From 2005 to 2011, LRIP slipped four years and five months and the FRP decision 
slipped five years and five months. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the schedule based on the 
schedule listed in the GAO reports (red line), the schedule until LRIP (blue line) and 
the schedule to FRP (black line). Values are measured from the start of program 
development. Data were not reported for 2006 due to the restructuring. The time to 
LRIP and the time to FRP essentially doubled between 2005 and 2007 (a 100% 
increase in the schedule). 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the R&D costs for the program. 
All costs have been adjusted for inflation. The GAO reports did not report a yearly 
R&D spending, so it was derived from the reported cost data. In the figure, the 
planned total program costs are shown as the black line with squares. The reported 
value for 2009 was artificially low and it was increased up by $172 million so that a 
realistic program total cost was given for 2009. The data show big total program cost 
increases for 2006 and 2007 (a total of 73% from 2005–2007). 
The R&D funding needed to complete the program, listed in the “Program 
Essentials” block in each GAO report, is shown as the green line with triangles. In 
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missing. A value of $220 million was assumed because it resulted in a linear 
spending profile from 2009–2011. 
The red line with asterisks is the actual R&D spending for each year. 
Spending was flat throughout the program. The blue line with diamonds is the actual 
R&D spending from the beginning of the program.  
Error! Reference source not found. shows the total production quantity, the 
procurement unit costs,16 and the program unit costs.17 There was a large decrease 
in quantity in 2009 (a 17% decrease) and large increases in the procurement and 
program unit costs (25%). 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the technical maturity for each 
year based on the GAO reports. Twenty critical technologies were identified for the 
program. Except for 2009, which seems to be in error, the highest percentage of 
technologies that were reported as mature was 65%. 
On most programs, the GAO uses the number of released drawings to 
measure design maturity.  Values were only provided for three years (see Figure 
27). The program reported 100% in 2005, but 83% in 2007 and 2008. 
The GAO write-ups do not have a specific measure of software maturity. As 
an approximation, the number of sentences in each report mentioning software was 
counted as a gauge of the software development. Error! Reference source not 
found. shows the number of lines in the GAO reports that mentioned software. 
While the write-ups discussed the software issues, the references to software were 
not proportional to the software problems the program faced. 
                                            
16 The procurement unit cost is the total procurement cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. Procurement unit cost does not 
include R&D costs. 
17 The program unit cost is the total program cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. The total program costs are the 
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Figure 22. JTRS: Overall Schedule 
Note. Each yearly schedule from the GAO reports is shown as a row in the table. Milestones such as 
DR (design review), LRIP, FRP, IOC, Nunn (Nunn-McCurdy breach), and DevStart (development 
start) are shown. The white cells are the year of the report and milestones shown in the white cells 
are planned to occur during the year. The milestones shown in the green cells had already occurred 
at the time of the GAO report. The milestones shown in the yellow cells were planned milestones at 
the time of the report for the years after the GAO report.  
 
 
Figure 23. JTRS: Schedule to LRIP and FRP 
Note. The red line with triangles is the program acquisition cycle time listed in the GAO write-ups (in 
months). The blue line with diamonds is the time from development start to LRIP (in months). The 
black line with boxes is the time from development start to FRP (in months). When data points are 
missing, a dashed line is drawn between points. The dashed lines are for visual purposes only. 
 
Project






2004 •Prog Start •Dev Start •DR •FRP
2005 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP •FRP
2006 •Prog Start •Dev Start •DR
2007 •Prog Start •Dev Start •DR •LRIP •FRP
2008 •Prog Start •Dev Start •DR •LRIP FRP ••IOC
2009 •Prog Start •Dev Start DR• •Restart •LRIP •IOC
2010 •Prog Start •Dev Start •Restart •LRIP •IOC
2011 •Prog Start •Dev Start DR• •Restart •LRIP
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Figure 24. JTRS: Costs by Year for the JTRS Program 
Note. The green line with triangles is the “R&D funding needed to complete” the program and is from 
the “Program Essentials” section of each GAO report. The value for 2010 was missing and a value of 
$220 million was used to achieve a linear spending profile from 2009–2011. The black line with boxes 
is the planned total R&D cost taken from the “Program Performance” section of each report. For 
2009, the reported value was revised up by $172 million so that a realistic program total cost was 
given for 2009. The red line with black asterisks is the R&D spending during the year. The blue line 
with diamonds is the Total R&D spending from the beginning of the project. It is derived from the 
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Figure 25. JTRS: Production Quantity and Unit Cost 
Note. The black line with squares is the procurement unit cost adjusted for inflation.  
The red line with triangles is the program unit cost adjusted for inflation (the program unit cost 
includes the R&D costs amortized over the total production lot). 
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Figure 27. JTRS: Drawings Complete 
Note. Data were not available for 2006 and 2009–2011. 
 
 
Figure 28. JTRS: Lines in the GAO Reports Mentioning Software 
 
E. Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): 2003–2011 (Nine Years) 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the program milestones that 
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a row in the table. The columns represent the different years in each yearly 
schedule. For example, in 2004, the LRIP decision was scheduled for April 2006 and 
IOC was planned for April 2010 (USMC version). 
The “Acquisition cycle time” is reported in every GAO report. Two values are 
given: the value given at program start (an historical value) and the most current 
estimate, which might change every year. In most programs, the planned acquisition 
cycle time at program start does not change because it is a historical value. For the 
JSF, the “approved” acquisition cycle time in the 2003 report was quoted as 185 
months as of October 2001. However, in the 2010 GAO report, the planned 
acquisition cycle time was quoted as 116 months as of October 2001. That is, the 
historical value changed. There wasn’t an explanation for why a different value was 
reported. The change in acquisition cycle times is reflected in Error! Reference 
source not found.. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the time to LRIP and the time to 
IOC from the GAO reports (measured from development start). There were very 
large changes in the “Acquisition cycle time” in 2009 and 2011. 
All costs have been adjusted for inflation. The GAO reports did not report the 
amount of R&D money spent each year, so it was derived from the reported cost 
data. The RDT&E cost data is shown Error! Reference source not found.. The 
planned total costs had significant increases in 2004 (10%), 2005 (19%), and 2011 
(11%). 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the total production quantity, the 
procurement unit costs, and the program unit costs. There was little change in the 
production quantity from 2004 until 2011. Program and procurement unit costs 
increased in 2005 (19%), 2007 (~6%), 2008 (5%), and 2011 (13%).  
Error! Reference source not found. shows the technical maturity for each 
year based on the GAO reports. Eight critical technologies were identified for the 
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The design maturity, defined as the “percent of drawings completed”, reached 
99% in 2008, but fell to 90% in 2009 (see Figure 34). It is interesting to note that the 
percent drawings complete is a predictor of future cost over-runs. In 2011, a 13% 
increase in RDT&E costs was realized. When the “percent of drawings completed” is 
an exact multiple of 10%, the validity of the value comes into question.  
The GAO write-up in 2006 mentioned software in eight sentences out of 33 
sentences describing the program (see Figure 35). The report also had the following: 
“Officials consider software a high risk item.” However, in the following years, there 
was much less emphasis on software (an average of about two lines per write-up). 
 
Figure 29. JSF Milestones As Reported in the GAO Major Weapon  
Systems Report 
Note. Each yearly schedule from the GAO reports is shown as a row in the table. Milestones such as 
DR (design review), LRIP, FRP, IOC, Nunn (Nunn-McCurdy breach), and DevStart (development 
start) are shown. The white cells are the year of the report and milestones shown in the white cells 
are planned to occur during the year. The milestones shown in the green cells had already occurred 
at the time of the GAO report. The milestones shown in the yellow cells were planned milestones at 
the time of the report for the years after the GAO report.  
 
Project





2003 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP •IOC
2004 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP •IOC
2005 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP •IOC
2006 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP •IOC
2007 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP •IOC
2008 •Prog Start •Dev Start DR ••LRIP •IOC
2009 •Prog Start •Dev Start DR ••LRIP •IOC
2010 •Prog Start •Dev Start DR ••LRIP •IOC
2011 •Prog Start •Dev Start DR ••LRIP •Restart •IOC
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Figure 30. JSF Schedule 
Note. The red line with triangles is the program acquisition cycle time listed in the GAO write-ups (in 
months). The blue line with diamonds is the time from development start to LRIP (in months). The 
black line with boxes is the time from development start to FRP (in months). 
 
 
Figure 31. JSF: R&D Costs 
Note. The green line with triangles is the R&D funding needed to complete the program and is from 
the “Program Essentials” section of each GAO report. The black line with boxes is the planned total 
R&D cost taken from the “Program Performance” section of each report. The red line with black 
asterisks is the R&D spending during the year. The blue line with diamonds is the Total R&D 
spending from the beginning of the project. It is derived from the “funding needed to complete” and 
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Figure 32. JSF  Production Quantity and Unit Cost 
Note. The black line with squares is the procurement unit cost adjusted for inflation. The red line with 
triangles is the program unit cost adjusted for inflation (the program unit cost includes the R&D costs 
amortized over the total production lot). 
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Figure 34. JSF: Design Maturity 
 
 
Figure 35. JSF: Number of Sentences in the GAO Write-Ups That 
 Mentioned Software 
 
F. Reaper: 2004–2011 (Eight Years) 
The Reaper program scope changed during the study. Error! Reference 
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published schedule is shown as a row in the table. The columns represent the 
different years in each yearly schedule. For example, in 2004 the LRIP decision was 
scheduled for January 2006, the full-rate production decision was planned for 
January 2008, and IOC was planned for December 2009. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the time to LRIP and the time to 
FRP from the GAO reports. There is a two-year slip in LRIP in the four years from 
2004 to 2008, and there is about an equal delay in the FRP decision. IOC did not 
change from 2004 to 2007, even though LRIP and the FRP decisions slipped 
significantly during this time period. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the R&D costs for the program. 
All costs have been adjusted for inflation. The GAO reports did not report a yearly 
R&D spending, so it was derived from the reported cost data. In the figure, the 
planned total program cost is shown as the black line with squares, and it increases 
rapidly starting in 2008 due to the increase in production units. 
The R&D funding needed to complete the program, listed in the “Program 
Essentials” block in each GAO report, is shown as the green line with triangles. It 
grew over time due to the large increase in production units. The 2010 GAO report 
did not list a figure for this curve so $350 million was assumed. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the total production quantity, the 
procurement unit costs,18 and the program unit costs.19 There were large quantity 
changes in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 (from 63 in 2007 to 391 in 2011). Normally 
the unit costs go down as quantity increases. They went up in 2008 and 2010, but 
went down in 2009 and 2011. From 2007 to 2011, unit procurement cost increased 
by 170%.  
                                            
18 The procurement unit cost is the total procurement cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. Procurement unit cost does not 
include R&D costs. 
19 The program unit cost is the total program cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. The total program costs are the 
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Error! Reference source not found. shows the technical maturity for each 
year based on the GAO reports. Four critical technologies were identified for the 
program, and it was reported that all technologies were mature starting in 2008. 
The GAO based design maturity on the number of drawings released. Error! 
Reference source not found. shows the number of design drawings completed for 
each year. In 2005 the “number of drawings completed” was 35%. It increased to 
85% in 2005, then was 80% from 2007–2008. The GAO reports stated 95% in 2009 
and 100% in 2011 (a value was not given for 2010). 
The write-ups do not have a specific measure of software maturity. As an 
approximation, the number of sentences in each report mentioning software was 
counted as a gauge of the software development. Error! Reference source not 
found. shows the number of lines in the GAO reports that mention software. The 
GAO write-ups do not mention software until 2007. From 2007–2009, software was 
mentioned once per year. It wasn’t mentioned in 2010, but it was referenced three 
times in 2011. 
 
 
Figure 36. Reaper Schedule 
Note. Each yearly schedule from the GAO reports is shown as a row in the table. Milestones such as 
DR (design review), LRIP, FRP, IOC, Nunn (Nunn-McCurdy breach), and DevStart (development 
start) are shown. The white cells are the year of the report and milestones shown in the white cells 
are planned to occur during the year. The milestones shown in the green cells had already occurred 
at the time of the GAO report. The milestones shown in the yellow cells were planned milestones at 
the time of the report for the years after the GAO report.  
Project






2004 •Prog Start •Dev Start •DR •LRIP •FRP Last ••IOC
2005 •Prog Start •Dev Start •DR •FRP •IOC
2006 •Prog Start •Dev Start •DR •FRP •IOC
2007 •Prog Start •Dev Start •DR •FRP •IOC
2008 •Prog Start •Dev Start LRIP• DR• •IOC
2009 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP •DR •IOC •FRP
2010 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP
2011 •Prog Start •Dev Start •LRIP •IOC
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Figure 37. Reaper: Time to LRIP and Time to IOC 
Note. The red line with triangles is the program acquisition cycle time listed in the GAO write-ups (in 
months). The blue line with diamonds is the time from development start to LRIP (in months). The 
black line with boxes is the time from development start to FRP (in months). When data points are 
missing, a dashed line is drawn between points. The dashed lines are for visual purposes only. 
 
 
Figure 38. Reaper R&D Costs  
Note. The green line with triangles is the R&D funding needed to complete the program and is from 
the “Program Essentials” section of each GAO report. The black line with boxes is the planned total 
R&D cost taken from the “Program Performance” section of each report. The red line with black 
asterisks is the R&D spending during the year. The blue line with diamonds is the Total R&D 
spending from the beginning of the project. It is derived from the “funding needed to complete” and 
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Figure 39. Reaper: Production Quantity and Unit Cost 
Note. The blue line with diamonds is the total production plan by year. Values are on the left axis. The 
red line with triangles is the unit cost adjusted for inflation (the unit cost includes the R&D costs 
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Figure 40. Reaper: Technical Maturity 
 
 
Figure 41. Reaper: Drawings Completed  
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Figure 42. Reaper: Number of Sentences That Mention Software  
in the GAO Reports 
 
G. Global Hawk: 2004–2011 (Eight Years) 
The yearly schedules and milestones for the Global Hawk program are shown 
in Error! Reference source not found.. Every published schedule is shown as a 
row in the table. The columns represent the different years from the schedules 
shown in the GAO reports. For example, in 2004, IOC was scheduled for December 
2005 and the full-rate production decision was planned for November 2006.  
This chart is useful because it clearly shows schedule slip as a function of 
time. There was a Nunn-McCurdy breach in 2005, but it wasn’t reflected into the 
write-up until 2007. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the time to a major milestone 
measured in months from development start. The reported “acquisition cycle time” 
was measured from development start to IOC, which was planned to occur before 
the FRP decision. The acquisition cycle time remained 57 months until 2007 when it 
increased to 78 months. Thereafter, it was reported as TBD (to be defined).  
The system was already in LRIP production (although one could argue that 
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2007 when the time to FRP jumped from 74 months in 2006 to 97 months in 2007 (a 
31% increase). There was a small increase in the schedule in 2009. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the R&D costs for the program. 
All costs have been adjusted for inflation. In the figure, the planned total program 
cost is shown as the black line with squares.  
The R&D funding needed to complete the program, listed in the “Program 
Essentials” block in each GAO report, is shown as the green line with triangles. The 
GAO reports did not report a yearly R&D spending, so it was derived from the 
reported cost data. The red line with asterisks is the actual R&D spending for each 
year. The blue line with diamonds is the actual R&D spending from the beginning of 
the program. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the total production quantity, the 
procurement unit costs,20 and the program unit costs.21 The planned quantity was 
flat at 51 units from 2004–2006 and was then flat at 54 units from 2007–2010. The 
quantity increased 43% in 2011 to 77 units. While the program unit cost decreased 
5% in 2011 due to the increase in quantity, the procurement unit cost actually rose 
7%. Normally, procurement unit costs should decrease due to learning curve effects 
and fixed overhead expenses being spread out over more units. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the technical maturity for each 
year based on the GAO reports. Initially, 14 technologies were reported as critical, 
but the number dropped to 10 in 2007. All were identified as mature starting in 2007. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the number of design drawings 
completed for each year. Data for 2006 were unclear and are not plotted. The 2005 
GAO report states that 90% of the engineering drawings were completed by late FY 
                                            
20 The procurement unit cost is the total procurement cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. Procurement unit cost does not 
include R&D costs. 
21 The program unit cost is the total program cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. The total program costs are the 
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2004. The reports stated 100% in 2007 and thereafter, although the 2008 report 
stated, “however, frequent and substantive engineering changes increased 
development and airframe costs and delayed delivery and testing schedules.” So 
while the drawings were “released,” they were far from being mature. 
The write-ups do not have a specific measure of software maturity. As an 
approximation, the number of sentences in each report mentioning software was 
counted as a gauge of the software development. Error! Reference source not 
found. shows the number of lines in the GAO reports that mention software. 
Software was mentioned twice per year for the years 2007–2010. 
 
Figure 43. Global Hawk Schedules 
Note. Each yearly schedule from the GAO reports is shown as a row in the table. Milestones such as 
DR (design review), LRIP, FRP, IOC, Nunn (Nunn-McCurdy breach), and DevStart (development 
start) are shown. The white cells are the year of the report and milestones shown in the white cells 
are planned to occur during the year. The milestones shown in the green cells had already occurred 
at the time of the GAO report. The milestones shown in the yellow cells were planned milestones at 
the time of the report for the years after the GAO report.  
Project






2004•P ••Dev Start rog Start••P ••Dev Start •DR •IOC •FRP •Last
2005•P ••Dev Start rog Start••P ••Dev Start •DR •IOC •FRP •Last
2006•P ••Dev Start rog Start••P ••Dev Start •DR •IOC •FRP •
2007•P ••Dev Start rog Start••P ••Dev Start •DR Nunn•OC •FRP
2008•P ••Dev Start rog Start••P ••Dev Start •DR •Nunn •FRP
2009•P ••Dev Start rog Start••P ••Dev Start •DR •Nunn •FRP
2010•P ••Dev Start rog Start••P ••Dev Start •DR •Nunn •FRP
2011•P ••Dev Start rog Start••P ••Dev Start •DR •Nunn •FRP
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Figure 44. Global Hawk: Time to FRP 
Note. The red line with triangles is the program acquisition cycle time listed in the GAO write-ups (in 
months). It was measured from development start to IOC, which was planned to occur before the 
FRP decision. After 2007, it was listed as “TBD.” The black line with boxes is the time from 
development start to FRP (in months). 
 
Figure 45. Global Hawk: R&D Costs By Year (Derived From the GAO Data) 
Note. The green line with triangles is the R&D funding needed to complete the program and is from 
the “Program Essentials” section of each GAO report. The black line with boxes is the planned total 
R&D cost taken from the “Program Performance” section of each report. The red line with black 
asterisks is the R&D spending during the year. The blue line with diamonds is the Total R&D 
spending from the beginning of the project. It is derived from the “funding needed to complete” and 









Figure 46. Global Hawk: Production Quantity and Unit Cost 
Note. The black line with squares is the procurement unit cost adjusted for inflation. The red line with 
triangles is the program unit cost adjusted for inflation (the program unit cost includes the R&D costs 
amortized over the total production lot). 
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Figure 48. Global Hawk: Drawings Completed 
Note. The number of drawings completed was not reported in 2006. 
 
Figure 49. Global Hawk: Number of Lines Mentioning Software 
 
H. Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High: 2003–2011 
(Nine Years) 
A historical look at the major SBIRS milestones by year is shown in Error! 
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table. The columns represent the different years in each program schedule from the 
GAO reports. In 2003, the first satellite launch was referred to as LRIP. For the 
following years, IOC was used to denote the first satellite delivery. For example, in 
2003, satellite launch (LRIP) was scheduled for October 2006.  In 2004, IOC was 
planned for September 2006. There was a Nunn-McCurdy breach in May 2004, 
which shows up as a large program unit cost increase in 2006 (the increase from 
2004 to 2006 was 81%). 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the R&D costs for the program. 
All costs have been adjusted for inflation. The GAO reports did not report a yearly 
R&D spending amount, so it was derived from the reported cost data.  In the figure, 
the planned total program cost is shown as the black line with squares.  
The R&D funding needed to complete the program, listed in the “Program 
Essentials” block in each GAO report, is shown as the green line with triangles.  
The red line with asterisks is the actual R&D spending for each year. The blue 
line with diamonds is the actual R&D spending from the beginning of the program.  
Error! Reference source not found. shows the total production quantity, the 
procurement unit costs,22 and the program unit costs.23 Because the system is a 
specialized satellite, the production quantity is very low and, thus, there can very 
large swings in the unit cost. 
Figure 53 shows the technical maturity for each year based on the GAO 
reports. Three critical technologies were identified for the program, and it was 
reported that all technologies were mature for 2003-2008 and 2010. In the 2009 
report, the GAO report stated that the program had split one technology into two, 
one of which was immature.  
                                            
22 The procurement unit cost is the total procurement cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. Procurement unit cost does not 
include R&D costs. 
23 The program unit cost is the total program cost divided by the total quantity, which are both 
identified in the “Program Performance” block of each GAO write-up. The total program costs are the 
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Error! Reference source not found. shows the number of completed 
drawings. The data are not consistent with the schedule slip and the continued 
increase in spending from 2003–2011. RDT&E spending was $1.52 billion, even 
though there wasn’t a change in the “number of drawings completed.” The relatively 
flat percentage of drawings completed (from 2009–2011) is also not consistent with 
the continued increase in RDT&E costs during those years. 
The write-ups do not have a specific measure of software maturity. As an 
approximation, the number of sentences in each report mentioning software was 
counted as a gauge of the software development. Error! Reference source not 
found. shows the number of lines in the GAO reports that mention software. The 
GAO write-ups mention software at least five times from 2008–2011, which is much 
more often than the typical GAO program write-up. 
 
Figure 50. SBIRS Schedule 
Note. Each yearly schedule from the GAO reports is shown as a row in the table. Milestones such as 
DR (design review), LRIP, FRP, IOC, Nunn (Nunn-McCurdy breach), and DevStart (development 
start) are shown. The white cells are the year of the report and milestones shown in the white cells 
are planned to occur during the year. The milestones shown in the green cells had already occurred 
at the time of the GAO report. The milestones shown in the yellow cells were planned milestones at 
the time of the report for the years after the GAO report.  
Project








2006 •DR •Nunn •IOC
2007 •LRIP •Nunn •IOC
2008 •LRIP •Nunn •IOC
2009 •LRIP •Nunn •IOC
2010 •LRIP •Nunn •IOC
2011 •LRIP •Nunn •IOC
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Figure 51. SBIRS: Cost Profile 
Note. The green line with triangles is the R&D funding needed to complete the program and is from 
the “Program Essentials” section of each GAO report. The black line with boxes is the planned total 
R&D cost taken from the “Program Performance” section of each report. The red line with black 
asterisks is the R&D spending during the year. The blue line with diamonds is the Total R&D 
spending from the beginning of the project. It is derived from the “funding needed to complete” and 
the “R&D cost” categories in the reports. 
 
 
Figure 52. SBIRS: Quantity and Unit Costs 
Note. The black line with squares is the procurement unit cost adjusted for inflation. The red line with 
triangles is the program unit cost adjusted for inflation (the program unit cost includes the R&D costs 
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Figure 53. SBIRS: Technical Maturity 
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V. Summary and Recommendations 
Risk management is one of the eight technical management processes in the 
overall systems engineering process. The process of risk management provides a 
framework for risks to be identified, analyzed, mitigated, and monitored. For 
example, defining stakeholder needs early in development reduces the chances of 
building the wrong system. Requirements analysis reduces the risk of a constantly 
changing functional baseline. Testing LRIP units as part of IOT&E reduces the risk 
of costly upgrades to full-rate production units. The list of mitigation activities is 
unbounded. It is not possible to examine every activity and its impact on risk 
reduction.  
This research paper addresses risk mitigation activities that are considered 
best practices and that are documented in the yearly GAO “Assessments of 
Selected Weapon Programs” reports. The GAO has spent a considerable amount of 
time every year evaluating several dozen major weapon system programs. This 
research project is based on the prior work by the GAO office. Namely, this project 
has involved the analysis and evaluation of eight major weapon system programs 
over a nine-year period (2003–2011). Changes in cost, schedule, and performance 
have been tracked over time, which provides a unique perspective to understanding 
program execution. 
This project has focused on some key systems engineering principles that are 
risk-mitigation activities. The best practices that have been evaluated in this 
research paper are the following: 
 Use of technical readiness levels24 to prevent immature technologies 
from being incorporated into new system designs since there is a high 
risk of cost overruns and schedule delays. This metric measures the 
maturity of technology being considered for use in a new weapon 
system. 
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 “Design drawings completed” is an important entrance criterion to the 
Critical Design Review. This metric measures the maturity of a 
system’s design before prototypes are built and tested. 
 Earned Value Management allows the government to monitor cost and 
schedule performance by the prime contractor. EVM provides an early 
and in-depth evaluation of progress by the prime contractor in the 
design of a new weapon system. 
 Production maturity evaluates the effectiveness of production activities 
and the potential for cost increases and/or schedule delays. 
One important best practice not directly addressed in the GAO reports is 
software development and test. 
A. Technical Maturity 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) are a measure used by the United 
States Department of Defense, other government agencies, and many of the world's 
major companies to assess the maturity of evolving technologies (materials, 
components, devices, etc.) prior to incorporating that technology into a new system. 
Generally speaking, when a new technology is first invented or conceptualized, it is 
not suitable for immediate application. Instead, new technologies are usually 
subjected to experimentation, refinement, and increasingly realistic testing. Once the 
technology is sufficiently proven, it can be incorporated into a system/subsystem 
(“Technology Readiness Level,” 2012). 
Unfortunately, based on this research project, TRLs are not a good indicator 
of program performance. Table 1 shows the number of technologies identified as 
mature versus the total number identified based on the yearly GAO reports. For 
example, “4/14” means that four of 14 technologies were identified as mature in the 
program write-ups. Except for JSF and JTRS, all of the other programs identified the 
technologies as mature, even though there were significant delays and cost 
overruns that occurred after the technologies were identified as mature. The cost 
increases in the program unit costs and the procurement unit costs are shown in 
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For example, the EFV program reported that all critical technologies were 
mature in 2005. From 2005–2011, the program unit cost increased by 122% and the 
procurement unit cost increased by 106%. The Excalibur, C-5 RERP, and SBIRS 
programs saw large increases in unit costs. The Reaper and Global Hawk effectively 
had no increase in program unit costs and showed 17% and 13% increases in 
procurement unit costs, respectively. The Reaper had a large increase in units, 
which helped to keep the unit cost increases lower. 
Table 1. Technical Maturity Levels for Eight Programs 
Program 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Excalibur 0 / 3 0 / 3 3 / 3 3 / 3 3 / 3 3 / 3 3 / 3 3 / 3 
EFV 4 / 5 5 / 5 5 / 5 5 / 5 4 / 4 4 / 4 4 / 4 4 / 4 
C-5 RERP 1 / 1 1 / 1 1 / 1 1 / 1 1 / 1 1 / 1 1 / 1 1 / 1 
JTRS Cluster 1 0 / 20 0 / 20 13 / 20 13 / 20 12 / 20 19 / 20 12 / 20 11 / 19 
JSF 0 / 8 0 / 8 1 / 8 2 / 8 2 / 8 5 / 8 6 / 8 5 / 8 
Reaper 3 / 4 3 / 4 3 / 4 3 / 4 4 / 4 4 / 4 4 / 4  
Global Hawk 4 / 14 5 / 14 6 / 13 10 / 10 10 / 10 10 / 10 10 / 10 10 / 10 
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Table 2. Program and Procurement Unit Cost Increases 





Excalibur 2006 to 2011 224% 136% 
EFV 2005 to 2011 122% 106% 
C-5 RERP 2004 to 2011 52% 38% 
JTRS Cluster 1 Did not reach full maturity 
JSF Did not reach full maturity 
Reaper 2008 to 2011 0% 17% 
Global Hawk 2007 to 2011 -2% 13% 
SBIRS 2004 to 2011 35% 167% 
B. Design Stability 
Use of “design drawings completed” is an important entrance criterion to the 
Critical Design Review. This metric measures the maturity of system’s design before 
prototypes are built and tested. According to the DAG (Defense Acquisition 
University [DAU], 2012), 
The CDR should be conducted when the product baseline has been 
achieved, allowing fabrication of hardware and coding of software 
deliverables to proceed. A rule of thumb is that 75 percent to 90 percent of 
(manufacturing quality) product drawings … are complete. (p. 267) 
Observations from the eight programs studied are as follows: 
1. Some of the values are questionable because they are an exact 
multiple of 10%. 
2. In many cases, the “percent of drawings completed” decreased after 
obtaining 98% or higher in a previous year. This suggests that a lot of 
redesign had taken place, that the measurement of the original value 
was poor, and/or that the original release of a drawing was before the 
design had stabilized. 
3. The number of drawings released may be an early indicator of large 
cost over-runs and schedule delays. For example, for the C-5 RERP 
program, the percent of drawings released dropped in 2007, but it 
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Regarding the phrase “product drawings are complete,” there are many 
different valid definitions. Ideally, documents “complete” should mean 
1. the design and all supporting information have been completed,  
2. the drawing has been developed,  
3. the drawing has been reviewed and approved by the appropriate 
people,  
4. the drawing has been made part of the physical baseline, 
5. the drawing has been released to manufacturing,  
6. a supplier and cost data have been identified, and  
7. the prototype has or will be manufactured using the “completed 
drawing.” 
Another wrinkle into the use of “drawings complete” is when an engineering 
change proposal (ECP) occurs. How changes to existing drawings and the addition 
of new drawings are reported will impact the reported percentage of drawings 
completed. 
Metrics that would aid in understanding the design maturity of a program 
include the following: 
 drawings released, 
 drawings modified and re-released (gross number and percentage of 
existing drawings), 
 new drawings (number and percentage of existing drawings), and 
 number of obsolete drawings. 
It is also important to track the severity of any changes in a drawing. For 
example, fixing a typo in the notes section of a drawing is not as significant as 
changing the design of the part, material callouts, tolerances, and so forth. The best 
measure of this will be if there is a change in “fit, form or function.” A way to easily 
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An important additional metric that is not directly related to drawings is the 
number of modified or new requirements. New requirements could cause large re-
design efforts, which could affect the number of released drawings. 
C. Earned Value 
Earned value management (EVM) is a project management technique for 
measuring project performance in an objective manner. EVM is able to provide 
accurate forecasts of project performance problems, which enables proactive project 
management. 
Earned value will be required25 on all of the programs in the reports because 
of the cost of the development or production. The requirement for EVM applies to 
cost or incentive contracts, subcontracts, intra-government work agreements, and 
other agreements that meet the dollar thresholds prescribed in DoD Instruction 
5000.02 (DoD, 2008, p.44).  
There were only a few programs that mentioned EVM in the GAO reports. 
2003  no programs 
2004  no programs 
2005  one program 
2006  two programs 
2007  four programs 
2008  six programs 
2009  six programs 
                                            
25 The application thresholds (total contract value including planned options in then-year dollars) are 
as follows: $20 million but less than $50 million—EVM implementation compliant with the guidelines 
in ANSI/EIA-748 is required. No formal Earned Value Management System (EVMS) validation is 
required. If $50 million or greater, then EVM implementation compliant with the guidelines in 
ANSI/EIA-748 is required. An EVMS that has been formally validated and accepted by the 
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2010  one program 
2011  two programs 
Even when mentioned, the data were often vague: for example, from the 
2004 GAO report on major weapon systems (GAO-04-248, p. 66), “Contract 
performance data indicates that work is slightly behind schedule and over cost.” 
In some cases, the EVM system was broken: for example, in the 2007 GAO 
report on major weapon systems (GAO-07-406SP): 
In March 2006, the lead contractor lost its earned value management 
certification due to a recent compliance review that found lack of progress in 
addressing long-standing systemic deficiencies. Without certified earned 
value management data, the Army will not have timely information on the 
contractor’s ability to perform work within estimated cost and schedule. 
According to the program office, the contractor did not make its first milestone 
detailed in the Defense Contract Management Agency’s corrective action 
plans in efforts to obtain earned value compliance. Still, the contractor plans 
to be compliant by the end of August 2007, 3 months after ARH low-rate initial 
production is scheduled to begin. (p. 38) 
D. Production Maturity 
Statistical Process Control (SPC) tools are a best practice, but they work best 
in production, usually on quantities in the many hundreds or more. Prior to actual 
production, a Production Readiness Review (PRR) will be an early indicator of 
potential manufacturing problems. Manufacturing readiness levels are useful for 
quantifying the maturity level of the manufacturing processes. 
There are many questions that are important for manufacturing a system: 
 Can the system be built per cost target? 
 Can it be built to the schedule? 
 Is the supplier base in place and stable? 
 What’s the lead time? 
 Does the contractor have a trained workforce? 
 Does the contractor have the necessary facilities? 
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 Does the prime contractor have a management plan for managing 
subcontractors? 
There is a good write-up on this topic in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook in 
Section 11.3.3.1 (DAU, 2012, p. 935): 
The quality management process begins early in the life cycle and continues 
throughout. The principal elements of the quality management process 
include:  
 Objectively evaluating performed processes, work products, 
product/process design and services against the applicable process 
descriptions, standards, procedures, policies, and documented 
expectations;  
 Understanding the full scope of customer requirements, assessing 
risks associated with meeting those requirements, and verifying that 
they are satisfied; 
 Identifying and documenting noncompliance issues, especially those 
affecting cost, schedule, productivity, and performance; 
 Using tools and techniques in a disciplined manner to determine root 
causes of noncompliance issues; 
 Addressing noncompliance issues by initiating and tracking corrective 
and preventative actions to assure the root cause(s) of the 
defect/deficiency has been identified and removed; and 
 Providing feedback to program managers, their staff, and corporate 
managers to identify lessons learned, improve process robustness for 
future projects, and evaluate trends. 
So even if a contractor is not using SPC, they need to have some data about 
how well they’re doing in the above activities. Something as simple as %scrap and 
%rework will give a lot of insight into the production effectiveness. If contractors can’t 
quantify those, then it’s impossible for them to accurately predict the cost of future 
production. 
E. Software 
There wasn’t enough attention given to software in the GAO reports. Design 
maturity is not just the number of drawings released. That is only a measure of the 
physical hardware design. Software is usually very important and risky on large 
weapon programs. Here are some statistics from the DAU level III course on 
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 64% of DoD software projects did not meet time/budget goals; 
 Half of projects overran cost estimates by 43%; and 
 15% of projects were canceled. 
Additional information on software from the DAU’s SYS-302 class is as follows: 
 Software controls most of today’s systems key functionalities; 
 Software is usually on the critical path; and 
 Software is a complex, conformable, changeable, and invisible 
product. 
On average,26 there were 2.1 sentences devoted to software in the GAO 
reports studied (i.e., eight programs over nine years). With the possible exception of 
the Excalibur program, software is a major component of the programs studied. 
For example, the importance of software is clearly stated in the SBIRS write-
up for 2008. Prior to 2008, there were only a total of three sentences devoted to 
software. However, there were seven sentences in 2008 and six sentences in 2009. 
(Write-ups were usually around 38 sentences long, not including the cost data).  
One part of the SBIRS write-up in the 2009 GAO report on major weapon 
systems (GAO-09-326SP) summed it up as follows: 
Design is considered stable since about 97 percent of expected design 
drawings are releasable. However, the program has experienced design-
related problems and more could emerge. For example, the flight software 
that controls the health and status of the space vehicle was found to be 
inadequate when it unexpectedly failed during testing in 2007. In April 2008, 
independent experts approved a new software design. DOD estimates the 
design changes will delay the first satellite launch at least 15 months to 
December 2009 and increase costs by about $414 million. Further cost 
increases and schedule delays are likely. (p. 136) 
This says that the problems with software will cost $414 million or more. 
Clearly, the problems with software were hidden during the period 2003–2007 
because only three sentences mentioned software in five years of reports. 
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It should not be difficult to acquire software metrics. Any company that claims 
to be CMMI27 (CMMI Institute, 2013) Level 2 or higher will be using metrics to 
manage their software projects. So theoretically, performance metrics should exist 
and should be reported. Some key software metrics include the following:  
 requirement count,  
 number of changes,  
 coding size,28  
 units tested, and  
 defect count. 
If the contractor is CMMI 2 or higher, then they should have identified metrics 
in their proposal and would be contractually obligated to generate and use the 
metrics. 
F. Final Comments 
There are various situations reported that deserve closer scrutiny, such as the 
following: 
1. increases in procurement unit costs when quantities increase, 
2. a drop in the percent of drawings completed, 
3. “drawings completed” that stay the same even when R&D spending is 
high, 
4. “drawings completed” that conveniently fall on a multiple of 10% (e.g., 
80%), 
5. lack of information on software development, and 
6. lack of information on T&E activities and accomplishments. 
 
                                            
27 Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) is a process improvement approach whose goal is to 
help organizations improve their performance. 
28 Lines of code is an easy way to measure the size of the software development, but it is not very 
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Appendix A. Technology Readiness Levels 
Table A1. Technology Readiness Levels in the Department of Defense (DoD) 
(“Technology Readiness Level,” 2012) 
 
Technology Readiness Levels in the Department of Defense (DoD) 
Technology 
Readiness Level 
Description Supporting Information 
1. Basic principles 
observed and reported 
Lowest level of technology readiness. 
Scientific research begins to be 
translated into applied research and 
development (R&D). Examples might 
include paper studies of a technology’s 
basic properties. 
Published research that identifies the 
principles that underlie this technology. 
References to who, where, when. 
2. Technology concept 
and/or application 
formulated 
Invention begins. Once basic principles 
are observed, practical applications 
can be invented. Applications are 
speculative, and there may be no proof 
or detailed analysis to support the 
assumptions. Examples are limited to 
analytic studies. 
Publications or other references that out-
line the application being considered and 
that provide analysis to support the 
concept. 
3. Analytical and 
experimental critical 
function and/or 
characteristic proof of 
concept 
Active R&D is initiated. This includes 
analytical studies and laboratory 
studies to physically validate the 
analytical predictions of separate 
elements of the technology. Examples 
include components that are not yet 
integrated or representative. 
Results of laboratory tests performed to 
measure parameters of interest and 
comparison to analytical predictions for 
critical subsystems. References to who, 
where, and when these tests and 
comparisons were performed. 
4. Component and/or 
breadboard validation in 
laboratory environment 
Basic technological components are 
integrated to establish that they will 
work together. This is relatively “low 
fidelity” compared with the eventual 
system. Examples include integration 
of “ad hoc” hardware in the laboratory. 
System concepts that have been 
considered and results from testing 
laboratory-scale breadboard(s). 
References to who did this work and 
when. Provide an estimate of how 
breadboard hardware and test results 
differ from the expected system goals. 
5. Component and/or 
breadboard validation in 
relevant environment 
Fidelity of breadboard technology 
increases significantly. The basic 
technological components are 
integrated with reasonably realistic 
supporting elements so they can be 
tested in a simulated environment. 
Examples include “high-fidelity” 
laboratory integration of components. 
Results from testing laboratory 
breadboard system are integrated with 
other supporting elements in a simulated 
operational environment. How does the 
“relevant environment” differ from the 
expected operational environment? How 
do the test results compare with 
expectations? What problems, if any, 
were encountered? Was the breadboard 
system refined to more nearly match the 
expected system goals? 
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model or prototype 
demonstration in a 
relevant environment 
system, which is well beyond that of 
TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step 
up in a technology’s demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a 
prototype in a high-fidelity laboratory 
environment or in a simulated 
operational environment. 
prototype system that is near the desired 
con-figuration in terms of performance, 
weight, and volume. How did the test 
environment differ from the operational 
environment? Who performed the tests? 
How did the test compare with 
expectations? What problems, if any, 
were encountered? What are/were the 
plans, options, or actions to resolve 
problems before moving to the next level?
7. System prototype 
demonstration in an 
operational 
environment. 
Prototype near or at planned 
operational system. Represents a 
major step up from TRL 6 by requiring 
demonstration of an actual system 
prototype in an operational 
environment (e.g., in an air-craft, in a 
vehicle, or in space). 
Results from testing a prototype system in 
an operational environment. Who 
performed the tests? How did the test 
compare with expectations? What 
problems, if any, were encountered? 
What are/were the plans, options, or 
actions to resolve problems before 
moving to the next level? 
8. Actual system 
completed and qualified 
through test and 
demonstration. 
Technology has been proven to work 
in its final form and under expected 
conditions. In almost all cases, this 
TRL represents the end of true system 
development. Examples include 
developmental test and evaluation 
(DT&E) of the system in its intended 
weapon system to determine if it meets 
design specifications. 
Results of testing the system in its final 
configuration under the expected range of 
environmental conditions in which it will 
be expected to operate. Assessment of 
whether it will meet its operational 
requirements. What problems, if any, 
were encountered? What are/were the 
plans, options, or actions to resolve 
problems before finalizing the design? 
9. Actual system proven 
through successful 
mission operations. 
Actual application of the technology in 
its final form and under mission 
conditions, such as those encountered 
in operational test and evaluation 
(OT&E). Examples include using the 
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Appendix B. Example of a GAO Report on a Major 
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2003 - 2012 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 
 Budgeting for Capabilities-based Planning 
 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition 
Budgeting Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-term Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 
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 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 RFID (6) 
 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
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